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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF DISCRETE EMOTIONS ON RISKY DECISION MAKING 
by Hoeun Sim 
Contrary to the dominant view that generally equates feelings with poor thinking, 
converging evidence indicates that decisions – including those involving risk – are 
influenced by affective experiences.  Research, however, is limited to studies on 
undifferentiated, global positive versus negative mood states; less is known about the 
influence of discrete emotions.  The purpose of this research was to extend the affect-
cognition literature by (a) examining the effects of discrete emotions varying along the 
dimensions of valence and arousal, and (b) identifying the systematic ways that discrete 
emotions underlie risky decision making.  We used a set of emotion-laden IAPS images 
to elicit and compare the impact of incidental emotions on risky decision making.  One 
hundred and twenty-two undergraduate students were randomly assigned to one of the 
four affective conditions: excitement, contentment, fear, and sadness.  Following the 
emotion induction procedure, participants completed the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire 
(CDQ) to assess their risk-taking propensity.  Results indicated an interaction effect 
between valence and arousal for positive emotions, such that excited participants were 
significantly more risky in their decision making compared to contented participants.  
The discussion focuses on the theoretical and practical health implications of these 
findings.  We recommend that future research capitalize on the insights gained from 
emotion research and use it favorably to improve decision making under risk. 
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Introduction 
 
  Affect influences nearly all aspects of cognition, ranging from how we perceive 
and interpret information, to how we process and utilize that information to inform our 
judgments and guide our behavior (Zajonc, 1980).  Thus, as humans who make decisions 
about trivial and occasionally consequential matters, emotions are paramount to our 
everyday lives.  Although the literature provides increasing empirical support for the 
affect-cognition relationship, support for this view falls short in comparison to traditional 
theorizing, which generally investigates affect and cognition in isolation, focusing 
primarily on the “cold” versus “hot” processes of thought (Hilgard, 1980).   
  The relative neglect of affect in the cognition literature can be largely attributed to 
the long-standing misconception that because emotions are primitive, they are disruptive 
and incompatible with reason and logic.  Consequently, even when affective influences 
are acknowledged, they are typically assumed to have an undesirable or interfering role 
(Loewenstein, 1996), an outdated view that traces back to classic scholars such as Plato 
and Freud (Forgas, 2008)—both of whom believed rationality was contingent on the 
suppression of emotions.  Bias towards affect-less cognitions is also apparent in the field 
of behavioral economics, where affective influences are either completely ignored or 
predominately overlooked by traditional decision theorists.  Proponents of conventional 
utility models (e.g., Expected Utility Theory), for example, postulate that the decision 
maker behaves as a rational agent, systematically calculating and comparing every 
possible probability associated with each choice alternative before deciding on an option 
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that presumably reflects the optimal, utility-maximizing outcome (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944).  
Conversely, the extant research suggests that animals, including humans, do not 
always adhere to the axioms of rational choice, that decisions – even those involving high 
risk – are colored by subjective, affective states.  For example, it is well-documented that 
individuals readily employ heuristics or informal strategies when making judgments and 
decisions under uncertainty (Tverskey & Kahneman, 1974).  Rather than logically and 
methodically evaluating each alternative to arrive at the most optimal outcome, decision 
makers often rely on such shortcuts (e.g., representativeness, availability, anchoring and 
adjustment, etc.) to efficiently generate an acceptable outcome.  To overcome these 
violations of Expected Utility Theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed an 
alternative model of risky choice, termed Prospect Theory.  
Unlike normative models, concerned with the way individuals should or ought to 
make decisions, Prospect Theory was developed as a descriptive model of decision 
making under risk.  The theory replaces the notion of utility with a value function, which 
is defined in terms of gains and losses (based on decision weights) rather than final 
outcomes (based on probabilities).  Moreover, it contends that individuals tend to 
overweight outcomes of low probability and underweight outcomes of moderate to high 
probabilities.  These biases are captured by the S-shaped value function, which is 
concave for gains but convex for losses.  That is, individuals evaluate gains and losses 
differently; we tend to be risk averse with respect to gains but risk seeking with respect to 
losses.  Additionally, the value function is steeper for losses than for gains, reflecting loss 
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aversion.  The effects of this cognitive bias have been replicated in number of 
experiments by varying the description of logically equivalent alternatives.  In the classic 
Asian disease problem, for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated that 
whether an alternative is framed positively (in terms of gains) or negatively (in terms of 
losses) can elicit systematically different decisions.  Although framing can occasionally 
produce judgmental biases and do not guarantee utility-maximizing outcomes, such 
mental shortcuts are sufficiently accurate.  That is, heuristics are accurate enough to be 
useful for decision-making, as they represent an adaptive strategy that enables one to 
quickly make decisions in an effortless and intuitive manner.   
Similarly, affective states, such as one’s feelings and emotions, can also serve as a 
heuristic (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 
1988).  Anecdotal evidence, for example, provides ample cases of when decisions are 
made “in the heat of the moment” or based on temporary, salient emotions.  Accordingly, 
the affect heuristic refers to the use of these momentary feelings as sources of 
information (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002).  This strategy can be 
particularly useful in situations during which a thorough cost-benefit analysis may not 
always be possible or advantageous.  With regard to risk assessments, Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, and Welchrefers (2001) describes a similar experiential mode of thinking, 
whereby individuals use their emotional reactions (e.g., fear responses) to gauge potential 
risks.  Known as risk-as-feelings, this processing strategy deviates drastically from the 
analytical mode of thinking, central in traditional utility theories.  
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Furthermore, converging neurocognitive evidence demonstrates that emotions are 
not only useful but also essential for adaptive reasoning (Frijda, 1986; Northoff et al., 
2006).  As Damasio (1994) proposed in his somatic marker hypothesis, decisions are 
guided by instincts, previously learned emotional responses associated with specific 
situations.  When the decision maker is confronted with risky choices, these emotional 
instincts automatically signal or mark information about the individual’s bodily, and 
hence somatic state.  In the same way that a threatening stimulus may signal alarm and 
activate the physiological processes (i.e., sympathetic nervous system) critical for 
preparing the individual to either challenge or withdraw from the threat (i.e., fight or 
flight response), decision alternatives evoke different emotions that signal either a 
positive or negative somatic state.  Whereas a positive state generally indicates favorable 
outcomes, a negative state signals potentially dangerous consequences and warrant 
detailed analysis.  Evidence for this is observed in patients with brain damage to the 
regions associated with the dispositional representation of emotional experiences.  Due to 
their impaired ability to utilize previously acquired emotional experiences, patients with 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage are unable to generate hunches about the relative 
desirability of future outcomes and consequently perform poorly in simulated gambling 
tasks, despite having their general cognitive abilities intact (Bechara et al., 1997).  Thus, 
somatic markers are essentially heuristics that aid the decision process by rapidly 
eliminating irrelevant choices and highlighting information that is most vital for further 
deliberation.  Affect, then, does not imply irrationality.  Both theoretical and empirical 
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findings suggest that rather than interfering or disrupting the cognitive processes involved 
in decision making, affective states, in most circumstances, play a supporting role.  
Although the role of affect in decision making is fundamental, much of the 
supporting literature have been limited to studies on mood.  One of the most robust 
findings is that positive mood tends to be associated with a more flexible, top-down, and 
optimistic approach, whereas negative mood tend to be associated with a more rigid, 
bottom-up, pessimistic approach  (Bless et al., 1996; Bower, 1981; Fredrickson, 2001; 
Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; for further review see Schwarz & 
Clore, 1996).  Support for this finding is illustrated in studies examining the effects of 
mood on stereotyping (Bodenhausen, 1993; Worth & Mackie, 1987).  The general 
finding is that individuals in a positive mood tend to process information less carefully, 
relying instead on simplified cognitive strategies (i.e., heuristics) such as schemata and 
stereotypes to inform their judgments.   
In explaining the differential effects of mood on cognitive processing, Schwarz 
and Clore’s (1988) affect-as-information model assumes that preexisting moods provide 
valuable information about one’s current situation, and thereby influence the processing 
strategies that one adopts.  That is, when faced with a task requiring a judgment call, 
individuals will often base their decision on their current mood, such as by asking 
themselves “How do I feel about it?”  The subsequent processing strategy employed is 
dependent on the nature of their assessment.  Whereas positive moods generally indicate 
a safe environment, negative moods signal a problematic situation that requires cautious 
action.  Furthermore, with regard to risk-taking behavior, the mood-maintenance 
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hypothesis postulates that positive affect—rather than negative—results in higher risk 
aversion (Isen & Patrick, 1983).  According to the model, individuals are generally 
motivated to maintain a positive state and minimize a negative mood state.  Therefore, 
individuals experiencing positive affect should be reluctant to take risks that can 
potentially diminish their pleasant feelings.  Individuals experiencing negative affect, on 
the other hand, should be more likely to seek risks, so as to replace their negative 
experience with more pleasant feelings (Hockey Maule, Clough, & Bdzola, 2000; Isen, 
1985).  
Building on the fact positive affect leads to greater cognitive flexibility and risk 
aversion, Isen (2000) proposed that positive affect should also promote efficiency and 
greater acceptance for decisions about gains, while promoting cautious deliberation and 
greater caution for decisions about costs.  Indeed, inducing positive affect in participants, 
such as through the use of a small gift reward, resulted in higher inclinations to gamble 
when the probability of winning was high as opposed to low (Isen & Patrick, 1983).  
Participants in whom positive affect was induced also showed greater sensitivity to losses 
than controls, preferring to bet less money in gambles with large potential losses but 
more money in gambles with small potential losses (Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 
1996).  Similarly, Cahir and Thomas (2010) found that positive affect led to less risky 
decision making.  Specifically, participants in the positive affect condition were more 
likely to make risk-avoidant decisions regarding a high-risk horse race game compared to 
those in the neutral affect condition.  As the authors noted, this finding could be 
explained by the mood-maintenance hypothesis; individuals experiencing positive affect 
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were perhaps betting on the lower risk horses in an attempt to preserve their current 
pleasant states.  
These findings collectively allude to the advantage of positive affect in inhibiting 
risky decision making, which appears to conflict with research documenting the heuristic-
like processing style associated with positive affect.  More specifically, they seem to 
contradict studies suggesting that negative affect is associated with analytic and cautious 
processing, characteristic of conservative decision making.  For example, Yuen and Lee 
(2003) found that participants who viewed a sad (versus happy and neutral) movie clip 
were less likely to demonstrate risky decision making on a subsequent decision task 
involving life dilemmas.  Further support for this finding has been demonstrated in 
studies investigating the influence of depression on affective decision making.  As the 
authors noted, results suggested that depressed participants, compared to their non-
depressed counterparts, displayed greater avoidance towards risky decisions and better 
overall performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (Smoski et al., 2008).  Moreover, Chou, 
Lee, and Ho (2007) found that, regardless of age, happy participants showered greater 
risk taking tendency than sad participants.  That is, the positive mood effect on risk-
taking proclivity was observed for both young and older participants.   
Taken together, the research reviewed indicates some disagreement regarding the 
role of affect on decision making, making it difficult to determine whether positive or 
negative affect is better suited to mitigate risky decisions.  One possible explanation for 
the discrepant findings between positive and negative affect concerns the need to 
distinguish between general mood and discrete emotions.  Although both fall under the 
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umbrella term of affect, emotions differ fundamentally from mood.  Unlike mood, 
emotional states are not homogenous, nor are they easily categorized into either 
positive/negative or pleasant/unpleasant dimensions (Barrett, 1998; Pfister & Böhm, 
2008).  Whereas mood tends to be diffused, lower in intensity, and longer in duration, 
discrete emotions such as excitement and fear represent unique experiential states that 
typically result from distinct causes, are higher in intensity, and are relatively shorter in 
duration (Izard, 1977; Smith & Kirby, 2000).  More precisely, emotions represent 
contextualized states that differ qualitatively from mood.  According to Pfister and 
Böhm’s (2008) framework on the multiplicity of emotions, emotions serves four main 
functions in decision making: they (1) provide evaluative information (2) enable rapid 
decisions under time pressure (3) direct attention to relevant information, and (4) promote 
commitment to selected decisions.  Although discrete emotional states have varying 
degrees of functionality, the majority of studies on affect have nonetheless focused on the 
differential effects of positive versus negative moods.  Emotions, however, are 
multidimensional; a one-dimensional, valence-based scale cannot sufficiently explain 
emotion-specific functions on decision making because neither all positive nor all 
negative affect are equal in the responses they produce.  
Different affective states that are mapped under the same valence scale can 
influence decision making in distinct ways.  A number of studies suggest that negative 
emotions, of varying intensity, can lead to differences in risk-taking (for a review, see 
Pham, 2007).  For example, Pham and Rajagopal (1999) found that sadness and anxiety 
predicted different preferences for gambles involving risk and reward trade-offs.  
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Specifically, anxious participants were found to be more conservative than sad 
participants, preferring the lower payoff with higher probability (low risk) option to 
higher payoff with lower probability (high risk) option.  These differences in risk-taking 
tendency were presumed to be due to the motivational bias underlying the need to repair 
one’s mood.  Whereas anxiety elicits the goal to reduce uncertainty and consequently 
leads to risk-avoidance, sadness elicits the goal to attain reward and consequently leads to 
risk-seeking behavior.  Moreover, previous studies on fear and anger suggest that 
although both emotions are negatively valenced, fear leads to risk-avoidance while anger 
leads to risk-seeking behavior, presumably because the former is associated with 
pessimistic risk evaluations whereas the latter is associated with optimistic assessments 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000).  Consistently, Leith and Baumeister (1996) found that anger 
triggered a preference for long shot gambles over safe bets, while sadness did not lead to 
this bias.  Thus, emotions have different functions, and depending on the specific 
emotions elicited (e.g., sadness, anxiety, fear, anger), such functions can influence one’s 
perception of risks in contrasting ways.  
To gain a coherent understanding of the cognitive consequences of affect, it is 
therefore critical to not only investigate beyond general mood effects, but also 
differentiate between the effects of discrete emotional states.  As the aforementioned 
studies illustrate, affective states are not functionally equivalent; emotions of the same 
valence can have distinct effects on judgment and decision outcomes, depending on the 
intensity of the experience.  Indeed, dominant models of affect (e.g., circumplex, vector, 
and Positive Activation – Negative Activation model) have traditionally classified 
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emotions as occupying both a valence and arousal space.  Arousal differs from valence, 
in that it refers to bodily activation (e.g., intensity) as opposed to hedonic (e.g., 
pleasantness) value (Barrett, 1998).  With regard to cognitive functions, Kaufman (1999) 
proposed a concept similar to the classic U-shaped effect, predicted by the Yerkes-
Dodson Law.  Cognitive performance is assumed to be optimum under moderate levels of 
emotional arousal; at extreme levels, however, fluctuations in emotional arousal can 
interfere and impair cognitive abilities.  In a similar vein, Lewinsohn and Mano (1993)’s 
two-dimensional model of emotions, based on valence and arousal, suggests that while 
positive emotions can facilitate more thorough and careful deliberation of choices, this 
can be disrupted by aroused states which generally produces heuristic processing.   
Moreover, studies that have taken into account discrete emotions are limited as 
nearly all pertains to negative emotions.  In a meta-analysis on discrete emotional 
influences, Lench et al. (2011) found that while the differential effects of discrete 
emotions on cognition and judgment are well-documented, evidence for this derives from 
studies on negative emotions.  The authors noted that because too few studies have 
included multiple positive emotions in their research design, a review of the differential 
effects of positive emotions was not possible.  Indeed, to date, research on the cognitive 
consequences of positive emotions is sparse.  The failure to consider the role of specific 
positive emotions constitutes a major limitation of decision research, as discrete positive 
emotions – like discrete negative emotions – can impact risk perceptions and subsequent 
choices in different ways.   
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To summarize, although the affect-cognition, hot-cold, irrational-rational 
dichotomy has waned considerably in the psychological literature, the majority of studies 
have focused primarily on contrasting the undifferentiated effects between positive and 
negative mood.  Less is known about the role of discrete emotions, and particularly 
discrete positive emotions, on risky decision making.  With these shortcomings in mind, 
the present study sought to extend the affect-cognition literature by investigating the 
effects of both positive and negative emotions with high and low levels of arousal.  
Emotions of interest were: excitement, contentment, fear, and sadness—as these affective 
states differ, both in terms of valence and in arousal level.  Whereas excitement and fear 
are associated with higher arousal, contentment and sadness are generally associated with 
lower arousal.  Seeing as heuristic processing tends to accompany aroused states, it was 
predicted that individuals in excited and fearful states would be more likely than 
individuals in contented and sad states to use the affect heuristic in judgments of risks.  
Additionally, because the affect heuristic generally involves relatively less exhaustive 
processing, it was predicted that individuals experiencing excitement and fear would also 
make greater risky decisions than individuals experiencing contentment and sadness.  
Specifically, three hypotheses were devised for the present study.  First, it was 
hypothesized that regardless of valence, individuals experiencing high arousal emotions 
(e.g., excitement and fear) will display greater risky decision making than individuals 
experiencing low arousal emotions (e.g., contentment and sadness) (Hypothesis 1).  We 
expected to replicate Lewinsohn and Mano’s (1993) findings, and hypothesized that 
individuals experiencing excitement will display greater risky decision making than 
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individuals experiencing contentment (Hypothesis 1a).  A similar effect was expected for 
negative emotions; it was hypothesized that individuals experiencing fear will display 
greater risky decision making than individuals experiencing sadness (Hypothesis 1b).  In 
the absence of high arousal, however, it was hypothesized that individuals experiencing 
sadness will display less risky decision making than individuals experiencing 
contentment (Hypothesis 2), replicating previous findings (Chou, et al., 2007; Smoski, et 
al., 2008; and Yuen & Lee, 2003).  Based upon previous findings from mood research, it 
was lastly hypothesized that, in the presence of high arousal, individuals experiencing 
excitement (i.e., positive affect) will display greater risky decision making than 
individuals experiencing fear (i.e., negative affect) (Hypothesis 3).  
Method 
Participants 
 Following Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval (see Appendix A), 
participants were recruited from San José State University’s research pool, through the 
SONA system.  One hundred and fifty-four students participated in the experiment in 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement.  Due to either missing or incomplete data, 
responses from 32 individuals were excluded from the analysis, resulting in a final 
sample size of 122 (59 female and 63 male) participants.  The age of participants ranged 
from 17 to 24 (M = 19.31 years, SD = 1.32).  All participants were required to have 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no prior or current history of animal phobias, 
defined as a persistent, irrational, or abnormal fear of dangerous and/or threatening 
animals (e.g., sharks, bears, snakes, dogs, etc.).  Each participant was randomly assigned 
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to one of the four conditions: positive valence + high arousal (excitement), positive 
valence + low arousal (contentment), negative valence + high arousal (fear), and negative 
valence + low arousal (sadness) (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
 
Affective Conditions by Valence and Arousal    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Materials 
 Affect induction procedure.  A subset of images obtained from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) was used to elicit the 
discrete emotions of interest.  The IAPS is a widely used instrument for emotion research.  
The database contains a large collection of emotionally evocative images, depicting 
various semantic categories, such as objects, activities, and landscape, to name a few.  
Based on normative ratings, the standardized images are categorized along three 
emotional dimensions: valence (pleasant/unpleasant), arousal (excited/calm), and to a 
lesser extent, dominance (low/high).  Because the objective of the present study was to 
 
 
Positive Negative 
High  Excitement n = 32  
Fear 
n = 30 
Low Contentment n = 30 
Sadness 
n = 30  
 
 
Arousal  
Valence 
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investigate positive (pleasant) and negative (unpleasant) emotions with varying arousal 
levels, valence and arousal were the only two dimensions considered, both of which 
Bradley and Lang (1994) demonstrated high reliability (r’s = .94 and .93, respectively) 
(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997).  Scored on a 9-point scale, valence ratings ranged 
from 1 (completely unhappy) to 9 (completely happy), with 5 constituting neutral 
valence.  Similarly, arousal ratings ranged from 1 (completely calm) to 9 (completely 
aroused), with 5 constituting neutral arousal.  Standardized IAPS images of discrete 
emotional content were retrieved from Mikels et al.’s (2005) archived files.  Specifically, 
9 positive valence + high arousal images constituting excitement, 9 positive valence + 
low arousal images constituting contentment, 9 negative valence + high arousal images 
constituting fear, and 9 negative valence + low arousal images constituting sadness were 
selected for each of the corresponding affective condition.  The subset of images was 
evaluated based on their individual mean valence and arousal ratings from the original 
IAPS database (see Table 2); this procedure resulted in a total of 36 images selected for 
the study.  Appendix B contains the subset of IAPS images, along with their description 
and catalog number.  
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Table 2  
 
Descriptive Statistics of International Affective Picture System (IAPS) Images for Each 
Affect Condition 
 
 Valence Arousal 
 
Condition M SD M SD 
 
Excitement 6.99 0.18 6.15 0.18 
Contentment 7.33 0.21 3.89 0.21 
Fear 3.89 0.23 6.28 0.13 
Sadness 2.89 0.18 4.24 0.19 
 
To ensure that participants, particularly those in the negatively valenced 
conditions, left the study in a positive mood, a second affect induction technique was 
employed near the end of the study.  The Autobiographical Recollection Mood Induction 
Technique (see Appendix C) is a reflection exercise, generally used in depression 
research to elicit episodic memories.  Baker and Guttfreund’s (1993) modified format, 
based on Brewer, Doughtie, and Lubin’s (1980) research, is a practical and effective 
procedure for inducing positive mood.  The task consists of two paragraphs of 
instructions, prompting participants to vividly recall two happiest events in their lives, 
where they felt as if they were “on top of the world.” After reflecting on these events for 
10 minutes, participants were asked to answer a few, brief questions about the events they 
had just imagined.  
 Decision-making task.  Participants’ proclivity for risky decisions making was 
measured using the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ; Kogan and Wallach, 1964).  
The CDQ (see Appendix D) is one of the oldest and most extensively used measures of 
risk-taking propensity.  The questionnaire consists of 12 detailed scenarios, describing 
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hypothetical but realistic life dilemmas.  In each scenario, participants are asked to 
imagine themselves in the position of the main character, confronted with a dilemma 
involving a decision between a low risk/low reward (cautious) and a high risk/high 
reward (risky) option.  Utilizing a multiple-choice format, participants indicated what 
they believe to be the acceptable probability, that is, minimum odds of success required 
before advising the protagonist to choose the more desirable but risky alternative.  The 
following is a generalized example of the response scale used in the CDQ: 
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable to make it 
worthwhile for Mr. X. to choose the risky option.  
___ The chances are 1 in 10 that the risky option will be successful.  
___ The chances are 3 in 10 that the risky option will be successful.  
___ The chances are 5 in 10 that the risky option will be successful.  
___ The chances are 7 in 10 that the risky option will be successful.  
___ The chances are 9 in 10 that the risky option will be successful.  
___ Place a check here if you think Mr. X. should not choose the risky option no    
       matter what the probabilities.  
 
Responses were scored using a 6-point scale, with the highest risk option (1 in 10) 
scored as 1 and the lowest risk option (the risky choice should not be taken, no matter 
what the probabilities) scored as 6.  Thus, risk propensity is reflected in the total score, 
summed from participants’ responses to the 12 items.  Scores can range from 12 to 72, 
resulting in an inverse relationship between total score and risk taking, with lower scores 
indicating higher risk-taking.  Overall, the CDQ demonstrated acceptable reliability, 
yielding a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69 for the 12 items. 
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Affect manipulation check.  Two different manipulation checks were employed 
to validate the affect induction procedure and ensure that the images were successful in 
eliciting each emotion.  
The Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994) is a pictorial rating 
scale designed to quickly and effectively assess an individual’s subjective emotional 
response along the IAPS’ dimensional framework of emotion (see Appendix E).  Each 
dimension is illustrated with five pictograms corresponding to the continuous values on 
the scale.  The valence dimension is represented in the first row and ranges from a figure 
smiling (pleasant) to a figure frowning (unpleasant), whereas the arousal dimension is 
represented in the second row and ranges from a figure with wide eyes (excited) to a 
figure with sleepy eyes (calm).  Scores are obtained following the presentation of the 
stimuli; participants are asked to indicate the emotion that best depicts their current 
reactions.  This may be done by selecting any of the 5 figures or the spaces between the 
figures, which results in a 9-point rating scale for each dimension.  For both scales, scores 
were recoded such that higher scores on the valence scale indicated more positive (i.e., 
pleasant) emotions and higher scores on arousal scale indicated more aroused (i.e., 
excited) emotions.  The SAM has been shown to demonstrate high reliability (Backs, da 
Silva, & Han, 2005), as well as strong convergent validity with previously validated self-
report measures of emotion.  For example, the Semantic Differential Scale (SDS; 
Mehrabian & Russell, 1974) is a relatively longer, verbal measure that employs the same 
affective dimensions as the SAM.  For both valence and arousal, Bradley and Lang 
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(1994) found near complete agreement between SAM scores and SDS factor scores (r = 
.96 and .95, respectively).  
The Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) is a valid and highly reliable self-report measure of affect (α = .86 to .90 for 
Positive Affect [PA]; α = .84 to .87 for Negative Affect [NA]).  It consists of 20 words 
that describe different feelings and emotions (see Appendix F).  Participants are asked to 
read each adjective and indicate, on a 5-point Likert-type scale, the degree to which they 
experience the emotion at the given moment.  The scales range from 1 (very slightly or 
not at all) to 5 (extremely), resulting in scores that range from 10-50 for both PA and NA.  
The PA score was calculated based on the sum of scores on items 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 
16, 17, and 19, whereas the NA score was based on the sum of scores on items 2, 4, 6, 7, 
8, 11, 13, 15, 18, and 20.  Lower scores for either PA or NA reflect low levels of the 
affect, and higher scores for either PA or NA reflect high levels of the affect.  Internal 
consistency measures, for the present study, generated a Cronbach’s alpha of .92 for PA 
and .84 for NA, verifying the scales reliability.  
Procedure    
The experiment took place in a computer lab at San José State University.  
Participants used the standard desktop computers provided to complete the study online 
through Qualtrics, a web-based survey software.  
Upon arrival at the lab, individuals were required to turn off all potentially 
distracting electronic devices.  In addition, to minimize risk of emotional discomfort and 
ensure that all were fit to view the negatively valenced, fear images, individuals were 
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verbally screened for animal phobias.  Only individuals without such phobias were 
considered qualified for participation; all reported that they met this eligibility 
requirement prior to beginning the study.  
 After completing the screening process and taking a seat at a standard desktop 
computer, individuals were instructed to read the online consent page (see Appendix G), 
which informed them that the study was concerned ostensibly with the effects of visual 
attention on judgment.  Individuals who did not wish to participate were instructed to end 
their session by clicking the “No, I do not agree to participate in the research study.  
EXIT” button; otherwise, they clicked the “Yes, I agree to participate in the research 
study.  CONTINUE TO STUDY” button, and were prompted to begin the study.  
The first portion of the study involved the affect induction phase.  Participants 
were assessed in groups ranging from one to ten persons, and were randomly assigned to 
one of the four affect conditions: excitement (n = 32), contentment (n = 30), fear (n = 30), 
and sadness (n = 30).  In each condition, participants viewed nine corresponding color 
images, displayed individually on the computer screen for 30 seconds at a time.  After 
viewing the set of images, participants competed the pre-decision affect manipulation 
check (SAM), followed by the decision-making task (CDQ), and subsequently, the post-
decision affect manipulation check (PANAS).  Upon completion of the aforementioned 
questionnaires, all participants underwent the positive mood induction procedure for 10 
minutes.  Following the exercise, participants completed a general demographic 
questionnaire (see Appendix H).  Finally, participants were directed to the debriefing (see 
Appendix I), where they were informed of the study’s true purpose and thanked for their 
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time.  Referral information for on-campus counseling services was provided should 
participants feel the need to seek support.  
 Results  
Validation of Emotion Induction Procedure 
To verify that the emotion induction procedure was effective in inducing the 
discrete emotional states, we calculated descriptive statistics for participants’ self-
reported affect ratings, following the exposure to the selected IAPS images.  Means and 
standard deviations for the SAM valence and SAM arousal ratings can be found in Table 
3.  Consistent with predictions, participants in the positive affective conditions reported 
more pleasant feelings than participants in the negative affective conditions.  An 
independent-samples t-test indicated a significant difference in mean ratings for the 
positive and negative conditions, t(120) = 3.66, p < .001.  Contrary to predications, 
participants in the high arousal affective conditions did not report more arousing feelings 
than participants in the low arousal affective conditions.  An independent-samples t-test 
indicated a non-significant difference in mean ratings for the high and low arousal 
conditions, t(120) = .28, p > .05.  
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) Dimensions for Each Affect 
Condition 
 
 Valence Arousal 
 
Condition M SD M SD 
 
Excitement 5.91 1.30 3.38 2.04 
Contentment 5.73 1.48 3.17 2.02 
Fear 5.63 1.27 3.47 1.87 
Sadness 4.20 1.00 3.87 1.74 
 
To test whether the affective states were maintained throughout the study, Pearson 
correlation coefficients were computed for the SAM valence ratings (i.e., pre-decision 
affect) and scores on each of the PANAS factors (i.e., post-decision affect).  SAM 
valance ratings yielded a significant positive correlation with PA scores (r = .37, p < 
.001) and a non-significant negative correlation with NA scores (r = -.11, p > .05), 
indicating that only positive affective states remained after the decision task.  Overall, 
these results suggest that the affect induction procedure was effective in eliciting and 
maintaining positive affect, but less effective in conserving negative affect. 
Influence of Emotions on Risky Decision Making   
A two-way (2 x 2) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted to examine the effects of discrete emotional states on risky decision making.  
The two independent variables (IVs) were the affective conditions: valence (positive vs. 
negative) and arousal (high vs. low).  The dependent variable (DV) was participants’ risk 
scores on the decision-making task, with lower scores indicating higher risk-taking 
proclivity.  The alpha level was set to .05 for all tests of significance.  
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that regardless of valence, individuals experiencing high 
arousal emotions (e.g., excitement and fear) will display greater risky decision making 
than individuals experiencing low arousal emotions (e.g., contentment and sadness).  
However, this was not supported as results for the two-factor ANOVA indicated no 
significant main effect for the arousal factor, F(1, 118) = 3.34, p > .05,  = .028.  
Participants were equally likely to be risk averse, regardless of whether they experienced 
high or low arousal emotions.    
Hypothesis 1a predicted that individuals experiencing excitement will display 
greater risky decision making than individuals experiencing contentment.  There was no 
significant main effect for the valence factor, F(1, 118) = .12, p > .05,  = .001, but 
there was a significant interaction between the effects of valence and arousal, F(1, 118) = 
4.54, p = .035,  = .037 (see Figure 1).  Analysis of the simple main effects revealed 
that Hypothesis 1a was supported, as differences between high and low arousal 
conditions were significant for positive emotions, such that CDQ scores were lower in the 
excitement condition (M = 39.13, SD = 7.24) than in the contentment condition (M = 
44.80, SD = 9.71), F(1, 118) = 7.96, p = .006, d = -.66. 
ηp
2
ηp
2
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Figure 1. Mean Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ) Risk Score as a Function of 
Valence and Arousal.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1b predicted that individuals experiencing fear will display greater 
risky decision making than individuals experiencing sadness.  However, this was not 
supported as analysis of the simple main effects revealed that differences between high 
and low arousal conditions were non-significant for negative emotions, F(1, 118) = .05, p 
> .05, d = .06.  Participants in the fear and sadness conditions did not differ with regard to 
CDQ scores. 
  Hypothesis 2 predicted that individuals experiencing sadness will display less 
risky decision making than individuals experiencing contentment.  However, this was not 
supported as analysis of the simple main effects revealed that differences between 
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positive and negative conditions were non-significant for low arousal emotions, F(1, 118) 
= 1.58, p > .05, d = -.33.  Participants in the sadness and contentment conditions did not 
differ with regard to CDQ scores. 
  Hypothesis 3 predicted that individuals experiencing excitement will display 
greater risky decision making than individuals experiencing fear.  However, this was not 
supported as analysis of the simple main effects revealed that differences between 
positive and negative conditions were non-significant for high arousal emotions, F(1, 
118) = 3.10, p >.05, d = -.44.  Participants in the excitement and fear conditions did not 
differ with regard to CDQ scores.  The means and standard deviations are presented in 
Table 4.  
 
Table 4  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ) Scores for Each Affect 
Condition 
 
Condition n Min Max M SD 
 
Excitement 32 25 57 39.13 7.24 
Contentment 30 27 69 44.80 9.71 
Fear 30 28 66 42.67 8.76 
Sadness 30 34 53 42.23 5.28 
 
Follow-up Analyses 
 Except for Hypothesis 1a, all other hypotheses were not supported.  This may 
have been due to, in part, the fact that the emotion induction technique was unsuccessful 
in inducing some participants to the designated emotional states.  As the findings from 
the manipulation check indicated, only positive affect was successfully manipulated.  
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Although negative affect was induced, it was not maintained; and neither high or low 
arousal level appeared to have been effectively manipulated.  To address this, we 
conducted follow-up analyses focused on participants in each condition who appeared to 
be in the designated emotional state.  Participants for each affect condition were 
identified based on their ratings on the SAM manipulation checks.  For the valence scale, 
scores between 1-4 were defined as low in positive valence (i.e., negative valence), 
whereas scores between 6-9 were defined as high in positive valence.  Similarly for the 
arousal scale, scores between 1-4 were defined as low in arousal, whereas scores between 
6-9 were defined as high in arousal.  Because a midpoint rating of 5 on either scales 
indicated neutrality, participants with this score were omitted from the analysis.  This 
procedure resulted in a sample size of 49 participants (n = 7, n = 26, n = 3, n = 13 for the 
excitement, contentment, fear, and sadness condition, respectively).  A second 2 x 2 
ANOVA was then conducted using this restricted sample.  Overall, the follow-up 
analysis did not reveal any significant differences between the conditions.  There was no 
significant effect of valence, F(1,45) = .33, p >.05; no significant effect of arousal, F(1, 
45) = .001, p > .05; and no significant interaction effect between valence and arousal on 
CDQ scores, F(1,45) = .15, p > .05. 
Figure 2 depicts the results of the follow-up analysis.  A noteworthy visual trend 
is that for participants who reported unpleasant emotional states, greater risky decision 
making was observed for those feeling higher arousal.  This is consistent with Hypothesis 
1b, which predicted that fearful participants will display greater risky decision making 
than sad participants.  Moreover, for non-aroused participants, less risky decision making 
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was observed for those feeling lower positive affect, a trend that is in line with 
Hypothesis 2, predicting that sad participants will display less risky decision making than 
contented participants. 
 
Figure 2. Mean Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ) Risk Score as a Function of 
Valence and Arousal Ratings in Follow-up Analysis based on Restricted Sample. 
 
 
To further investigate the relationship between self-reported affect and risky 
decision making, we also conducted correlation coefficients for participants’ ratings on 
each of the SAM dimensions and their scores on the CDQ.  Results indicated that 
subjective arousal ratings did not correlate significantly with CDQ scores (r = .09, p > 
.05).  However, there was a significant negative correlation between subjective valence 
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ratings and CDQ scores (r = -.16, p < .05).  Greater positive affect was associated with 
lower CDQ scores, and hence higher risk-taking tendency.  
Discussion 
  The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the influence of emotions on decision 
making under risk.  In particular, we were interested in examining how risky decision 
making may be affected by discrete emotions, varying along two dimensions: valence 
(positive vs. negative) and arousal (high vs. low).  Participants’ risk-taking propensity 
was assessed immediately following the induction to one of the four emotional states: 
excitement, contentment, fear, and sadness.   
  Overall, the results partially supported Hypothesis 1; participants in the high 
arousal conditions displayed greater risk-taking behavior on the decision-making task 
than individuals in the low arousal conditions.  However, this difference was only 
statistically significant for participants experiencing positive affect.  That is, consistent 
with Hypothesis 1a, excited participants engaged in greater risky decision making than 
their contented counterparts.  Contrary to Hypothesis 1b, participants in the fear condition 
did not differ significantly from those in the sadness condition.  Moreover, there was no 
significant difference between the sadness and contentment conditions (Hypothesis 2), or 
between the excitement and fear conditions (Hypothesis 3) with regard to risk-taking 
behavior.  Taken together, these results reveal important relationships between emotional 
states and risky decision making.  In the subsequent sections, the implications of our 
findings, the limitations of the study, as well as future directions for research are 
discussed. 
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Limitations and Future Directions  
  The present study has several limitations that warrant further investigation.  A 
major caveat is that the data revealed no significant effect of negative affect (e.g., fear 
and sadness) on CDQ scores.  As with any affect induction method, ranging from film 
and audio clips to unexpected gifts and feedback, the use of images does not guarantee 
perfect elicitation of emotions.  It is possible that the images we utilized in our affect 
induction procedure were simply insufficient to elicit and maintain the target emotions.  
However, because we used a subset of standardized IAPS images that has been 
previously identified and validated to induce the discrete emotions of interest (Mikels et 
al., 2005), it is unlikely that the problem is due entirely to the inadequacy of the 
elicitation method.  
An alternative explanation concerns the social context in which participants 
underwent the emotion elicitation, which varied from one to ten persons per experimental 
session.  Whether participants were induced individually or among others can impact the 
emotional salience and intensity of the stimuli, moderating its effects on subsequent 
decision making.  Indeed, in a meta-analysis examining the effectiveness of various 
experimental emotion elicitation methods, Lench et al. (2011) found stronger effects for 
studies that induced participants individually rather in groups.  As proposed by the 
authors, it may be that the emotional experience becomes “diffused” or reduced by the 
presence of others.  To be effective, emotion elicitation methods require participants’ 
attention and engagement; it is possible that participants assessed in groups were more 
distracted and less focused during the induction than those assessed alone.  It is thus 
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imperative that future research recognize this threat, and consider eliciting emotions in 
more controlled settings as this may increase the efficacy of the study.  
Additionally, individuals may differ in their tendency to experience, interpret, and 
react to certain emotions, all of which can impact the emotion-decision making 
relationship.  For example, there is evidence indicating that different personality 
dispositions consistently render individuals more susceptible to certain affective stimuli 
across situations.  Specifically, within the “Big Five” framework of personality (Costa & 
McCrae, 1980), extraversion and neuroticism are two dimensions that have been found to 
correspond with affective experience.  In general, individuals who score high in 
extraversion tend to experience and report greater positive emotions, whereas individuals 
who score high in neuroticism tend to experience and report greater negative emotions 
(Watson & Clark, 1992; Rusting & Larsen, 1995).  This sensitivity to either positive (e.g., 
rewards and benefits) or negative (e.g., threats and risks) events can contribute to 
affective influences on judgment either by strengthening or weakening the effects 
(Rusting, 1998).  Although we attempted to minimize the probability of preexisting trait 
differences through the use of random assignment, this process does not ensure that all 
individuals were equivalent across experimental conditions.  By chance, individuals may 
still differ on stable affective traits that can interact with affective states to alter their 
decision making.  Therefore, depending on their personality traits, individuals may 
respond differently to the emotional stimuli, despite being induced to the same emotional 
state.  To address this issue, researchers should take into account emotion-relevant 
personality traits and incorporate - rather than attempt to control - such variables into 
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future studies on emotions and decision making.  Doing so will certainly add to our 
understanding of the role of emotion-relevant personality dispositions, and how they may 
moderate or mediate the extent to which emotional states influence decisions about risk.  
Another possibility concerns the limitation inherent in self-report measures.  In 
assessing the effectiveness of the emotion induction procedure, due to time and practical 
constraints, we relied solely on participants’ self-reports of emotional experience.  
Although both the SAM and PANAS have been shown to be reliable and valid measures 
of affective experience, subjective measures are nonetheless likely to be biased—based at 
least partially on participants’ perceptions and beliefs (i.e., cognitions) about their 
emotional experience, which may be different from their actual experience (Robinson & 
Clore, 2002).  In the present study, we found that participants’ self-reported ratings 
indicated no significant difference in subjective arousal, yet data from the post-hoc 
analysis detected that participants in the (positive) high and low arousal conditions 
differed in their performance on the decision task.  Because of this discrepancy, we have 
reasons to suspect that self-reported affect may not accurately reflect experienced affect.  
An alternative approach would be to supplement self-report ratings with more 
direct, objective assessments of affect.  Although, it is uncertain as to whether they 
actually reflect or merely correlate with emotional arousal, physiological indices of 
emotional arousal, such as skin conductance activity, heart rate, cortisol levels, and so on, 
can provide unbiased indication of intensity.  Moreover, technological advances in brain 
imaging techniques within the field of cognitive neuroscience have accelerated major 
progress towards mapping the neural bases of affective and cognitive processes.  Studies 
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using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for example, provide considerable 
observational evidence for a functional and anatomical overlap between lower level and 
higher level processes within the brain, with namely the limbic system and prefrontal 
cortex as the two critical brain regions implicated in affective decision making (Gutnik et 
al., 2006).  Empirical findings such as these do not only corroborate previous conceptions 
of the intimate link between affect and cognition, but also provide opportunities to test 
their validity.  Therefore, when feasible, future emotion studies should include both 
subjective and objective forms of measurement.  
Finally, the lack of external validity of the CDQ raises another concern.  Although 
the CDQ attempts to measure common and everyday decision making by utilizing a wide 
range of real life scenarios, the scenarios are nonetheless hypothetical and may not be 
sufficient to simulate real world choice dilemmas, limiting the validity and 
generalizability of our findings.  Consequently, it is unclear whether results actually 
reflect participants’ choice behaviors, or simply their imagined behaviors in the 
situations, which may not parallel their decision making in the real world.  In an effort to 
guard against this threat, we instructed participants, for each situation, to place 
themselves in the position of the central character, that is, as the person making the 
decision.  Although explicit, these instructions may not be enough to incentivize realistic 
decision making, as the absence of real risks and tangible rewards may have made the 
task less meaningful and personally relevant for participants.  Given this limitation, future 
research would benefit from more ecologically valid measures of risky choice, such as 
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questionnaires and gambling tasks that require active engagement and involve weighing 
genuine risks and consequences.  
Another solution is to move outside of the laboratory setting and extend decision 
research to naturalistic environments that are more conducive to risky decision making.  
In the medical domain, for example, individuals (e.g., clinicians, nurses, patients) are 
often required to process information and make critical decisions, involving major risks 
and consequences with respect to one’s health.  Furthermore, these high-risk decisions 
are frequently made under uncertain, intensified, and emotional conditions (Bagnara, 
Parlangeli, & Tartaglia, 2010; Resnick, 2012).  Greater awareness of how both pleasant 
and unpleasant emotional experiences, ranging in intensity, can influence risk perceptions 
and lead to fundamentally different decisions would prove valuable for optimizing health 
outcomes.  Thus, future field research is needed to investigate the extent to which 
findings, found in the lab, may be replicated and applied beneficially to decision making 
in healthcare and similar practical settings. 
Implications  
  The current study demonstrated the multifaceted nature of emotions.  Within the 
context of decision making, we found that positive emotions - irrelevant to the decision 
task - can impair judgment, resulting in more risky choices.  However, this outcome was 
observed only for individuals induced to experience excitement; similar effects were not 
found for individuals induced to experience contentment.  Thus, despite both being 
pleasant emotions, excitement and contentment, were discovered to have distinct effects 
on decision making, with the former leading to greater risky decision making.  
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  Seeing as excited individuals made more risky decisions compared to contented 
individuals, it is reasonable to assume that arousal - the distinguishing factor of the two 
emotional states - accounted for the higher risk-taking behavior.  This explanation is 
consistent with previous research contrasting the effects of elation with calmness.  
Compared to calm participants, Lewinsohn and Mano (1993) found that elated 
participants applied less cognitively demanding strategies on a multi-attribute choice 
task.  They not only spent less time deliberating, but also examined less information 
before making their decision, indicating that it was the enhanced arousal associated with 
more elated emotions - not the positive hedonic tone per se - that resulted in the 
suboptimal decision strategies. 
  Accordingly, traditional theories posit that arousal impacts cognitive performance 
by adapting the focus of attention (Easterbrook, 1959; Kahneman, 1973), which can be 
beneficial or disruptive depending on the situation.  Generally, under high arousal 
situations, attention is decreased and limited to only a few, more relevant attributes.  In 
contrast, under low arousal situations, attention is increased and allocated to both relevant 
and less relevant attributes.  Therefore, the greater arousal accompanying excited states 
may have caused attentional narrowing, forcing excited individuals to employ more 
simplified processing strategies and, consequently, make more risky decisions.  
Contented individuals, on the other hand, were not subjected to the arousal-induced 
narrowing; due to their broader attention capacity, they were able to process the choices 
more thoroughly and decide more cautiously.  It appears, then, that risky decision making 
is influenced by not only affective valence but arousal level as well.  Importantly, this 
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interpretation may help reconcile some of the inconsistencies regarding the role affective 
states on cognitive processes and decision outcomes.  
  Research examining the cognitive consequences of affect reveal somewhat 
conflicting findings, as the data suggests that affective states can be both facilitating and 
biasing to cognitive processing.  However, it should be noted that previous research on 
affect were based predominately on the one-dimensional view (Pfister & Böhm, 2008), 
which assumes that essentially all affective states can be mapped into a single valence 
scale.  Unlike global mood states, however, specific emotions are not easily reducible to 
either a positive or negative dimension, making the one-dimensional framework 
incomplete for the study of discrete emotions.  Under this framework, the effects of 
conceptually different emotions may be inaccurately attributed to valence, when in fact a 
separate or additional dimension(s) may be contributing to the relationship.  Indeed, our 
findings suggest that, consistent with the circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980), 
affective experiences entail at least two dimensions: valence and arousal.  Based on this 
two-dimensional view, we discovered that discrete positive emotions can assume either a 
functional or dysfunctional role, depending on the accompanying arousal level. 
  Both valence and arousal dimensions can affect the extent to which emotions are 
managed, which, in turn, may also influence decision making about risk.  Congruent with 
mood-maintenance hypothesis (Isen & Patrick, 1983), the literature on emotion 
regulation (ER) notes that individuals are generally motivated to control their emotions, 
so as to prolong positive experiences and mitigate negative experiences (Gross, 2002).  
Importantly, this may explain the attenuation of negative affect and why such states did 
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not persist throughout the task.  Participants were perhaps actively adapting their 
responses to maintain a positive emotional state, provided that the negative emotions of 
fear and sadness generated sufficient unpleasant reactions.  With regard to positive 
emotions, two effective ER strategies include cognitive reappraisal, which occurs before 
the emotional experience and involves redefining the situation; and expressive 
suppression, which occurs after the emotional experience and involves inhibiting the 
emotional response (Gross, 2002; Heilman et al., 2010).  Implementing either the 
reappraisal or suppression strategy, however, requires cognitive effort, which can be 
demanding especially for individuals already limited in attentional resources.  Given that 
emotions coupled with high arousal (versus low arousal) are relatively intense and 
cognitively taxing, it is probable that individuals experiencing excitement (versus 
contentment) were ill-equipped and perhaps less keen to employ such strategies.  Instead 
of attempting to regulate their affect, excited individuals may have adopted the more 
efficient approach, and relied on these emotional reactions to guide their decisions (i.e., 
the affect heuristic).  
  The implications of this research are particularly pertinent to the health domain 
where biased risk assessments, originating from emotional states, can affect physical 
well-being.  With respect to health outcomes, previous research indicates a mood-
congruent effect, with happy individuals reporting less physical complaints and 
symptoms than sad individuals (Croyle & Uretsky, 1987; Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989).  If 
indeed contented individuals are more adept at ER and therefore better able to prolong 
positive emotional experiences, they may also be more likely to experience positive 
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health outcomes.  On the other hand, feeling intensely positive can lead to overly 
optimistic assessments about one’s vulnerability to illnesses.  In their study on health 
perception, Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) found that positive mood resulted in biased 
estimates, such that happy individuals believed they were less likely to be affected by 
future diseases compared to their peers.  As was the case with excited individuals in the 
present study, this bias can lead to risky decisions and potentially unhealthy behaviors. 
  Because disorders involving addiction and impulsivity tend to have a strong 
affective component, it is not surprising that emotions have also been shown to influence 
decisions related to impulse control, such as the decision to smoke cigarettes.  As Slovic 
(2001) observed, the initial decision to smoke is heavily driven by emotional impulses 
rather than conscious thought.  For most new smokers, the excitement preceding the 
initiation can be exacerbated with affectively salient advertising designed to associate 
positive emotions with the smoking experience, thereby leaving target populations 
especially prone to initiate the activity.  Unfortunately, the long-term health risks of 
smoking are not recognized until after many unsuccessful attempts to quit, when it is 
often too late.  This presents costs at both the individual and the societal level, as tobacco 
use remains the leading cause of preventable deaths in the United States, accounting for 
more than 480,00 deaths annually (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 
2015).  In addressing this issue, some researchers have advocated the use of the affect 
heuristic to combat smoking.  For example, Hammond and colleagues (2004) found that 
cigarette warning labels that elicit discrete emotional responses, such as fear and disgust, 
can be a cost-effective deterrent to smoking.  As the authors noted, smokers who reported 
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greater negative reactions to the graphic images were significantly more likely to report 
greater attempts to quit or reduce smoking on a follow-up survey, three months later. 
  Several studies have also found an association between perceived risk probability 
and subsequent risk-reduction behaviors.  Individuals who perceive themselves to be 
susceptible to illnesses are more likely to take protective actions in the future, such as 
changing their behavior or seeking medical screening and treatment.  In a longitudinal 
study on Lyme disease vaccination, Brewer et al. (2004) found that compared to 
participants with lower risk judgments, those who had higher risk judgment for the 
disease were more likely to get vaccinated, suggesting that risk perceptions about one’s 
health status can encourage health-related behavioral changes.  Seeing as affective states 
can influence perceived risk probability, and perceived risk probability can influence 
risk-reduction behaviors; it follows, then, that some emotions can serve as compelling 
mechanisms to guide decisions and improve behaviors related to health. 
  These findings collectively highlight, once more, how affective states can be both 
adaptive and maladaptive, depending on the situation and circumstances.  As the 
significance of emotions is becoming increasingly recognized in the decision literature, 
however, it is important for researchers to extend beyond merely describing its positive 
and negative impact in decision making.  A comprehensive understanding of how 
discrete emotions systematically influences risky decision making is necessary to identify 
which emotions are most supportive for fostering positive health and preventing or 
reducing adverse outcomes.  Thus, a promising line of inquiry for future research 
concerns exploration into how knowledge about discrete emotions can be “leveraged” to 
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positively influence and improve decision making (Ferrer et al., in press), with the 
overarching goal of promoting healthy behavior for all. 
Conclusions 
  Although the role of affect in decision making is well-established, research has 
focused primarily on description, namely of the biases arising from broad positive and 
negative mood states.  In an effort to better understand the relationship between feeling 
and thinking, we examined the effects of four discrete emotions, varying along the 
dimensions of valence and arousal.  By experimentally manipulating these emotions, we 
were able to influence how participants in the positive conditions evaluated the 
probability of risk, effectively altering their decision making across a variety of 
dilemmas.  The differential effects observed between excited and contented participants 
on the decision-making task does not only confirm that emotions are multidimensional, 
comprising of both valence and arousal, but also that its biasing effects on risk-taking is 
likely linked to the greater arousal experienced with more elated emotions.  Overall, these 
findings have important implications for the health domain, as it suggests that discrete 
emotions can shape risk perceptions and, consequently, decision making about health-
related issues in systematic ways.  Given that the role of affect in risky decision making 
can be both enhancing and biasing, the fruitful question for future research concerns not 
whether emotions are inherently good or bad, but how these emotions can be used to 
improve decision making and overall well-being.   
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Appendix B  
IAPS Image Descriptions and Numbers 
Excitement  
 
 Fear   
Description  No. Description  No.  
Skier 
Skier 
Skier 
Football 
Hockey 
WaterSkier 
Runners 
Rafting 
Rafters 
 
8030 
8031 
8034 
8116 
8117 
8200 
8220 
8370 
8400 
 
 
 
Snake  
Snake  
Snake  
Dog  
Dog  
Bear 
Shark  
Shark  
Tornado  
 
1052 
1110 
1113 
1301 
1302 
1321 
1930 
1931 
5972 
 
Contentment 
 
Sadness   
Description  No. Description  No.  
Dog 
NeutBaby 
Girl  
Family  
Couple  
Mother  
Picnic  
Couple  
Nature  
 
1500 
2260 
2304 
2360 
2530 
2540 
2560 
4700 
5201 
 
Hospital  
Girl  
Mother  
Man  
ElderlyWoman  
DisabledChild 
Cemetery  
ScaredChild 
HomelessMan  
 
2205 
2276 
2312 
2490 
2590 
3300 
9000 
9041 
9331 
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Appendix C 
Autobiographical Recollection Mood Induction Procedure 
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Appendix D 
Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ)
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Appendix E  
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) 
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Appendix F 
Positive and Negative Affective Scales (PANAS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	 	 57	
	 	
  
	
Appendix G 
Consent Form 
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Appendix H 
Demographics Form
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Appendix I 
Debriefing Form 
 
